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The General Exemption of Section 522(d)(5)
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code"),1 as every
commentator addressing it invariably notes,2 is the first major revi-
sion of bankruptcy law in over forty years.3 As befits so major an
undertaking in so complex an area, the Code is lengthy, detailed,
and-inevitably-flawed with technical error and ambiguity.4
1 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as Title 11 of the United States
Code (Supp. IV 1980)). The Code took effect on October 1, 1979, but its bankruptcy court
system will not be fully implemented until April 1, 1984. See infra note 9.
2 The general commentary on the Code is too extensive for complete citation. For aca-
demic commentary, see, e.g., Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Em-
ployment-for-Lawyers Bill (pt. 1), 1979 UTAH L. REV. 1; Dole, The New Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code: An Overview and Some Observations Concerning Debtors' Exemptions, 17
Hous. L. REv. 217 (1980); The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 EMORY L.J. 581 (1979).
For commentary by judges and practitioners, see, e.g., Bare, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 47 TENN. L. REV. 501 (1980); Chatz, Costello & Gross, An Overview of The Bank-
ruptcy Code, 84 CoM. L.J. 259 (1979); Hughes, Code Exemptions: Far-Reaching Achieve-
ment, 28 DEPAuL L. REV. 1025 (1979); Lindsey, The New Bankruptcy Law: A Guide for the
Non-Specialist, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 368 (1979); Mapother, Federal Exemptions Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 44 Ky. BENCH & B. 12 (1980); Poorman, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
32 OKLA. L. REv. 583 (1979); Williams, The New Bankruptcy Act - From a Creditor's
Point of View, 6 ORANGE CouNTy B.J. 15 (1979). For commentary by persons active in the
enactment of the Code, see, e.g., Butler, A Congressman's Reflections on the Drafting of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557 (1980); Klee, Legislative History of
the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980). For treatises on the Code and its
effect on bankruptcy practice, see, e.g., COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1979); COMMERCE
CLEARING HOUSE EDITORIAL STAFF, BANKRtwrcY REFORM ACT OF 1978 P.L. 95-598: LAw, Ex-
PLANATION, SELECTED COMMITrEE REPORTS (1978); D. CoWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRAc-
TICE (2d ed. Supp. 1979); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTcY REFORM ACT OF 1978
(1978).
3 The Code repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544,
which had undergone its last major revision in 1938 under the provisions of the Chandler
Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
4 Congress has long been aware of the drafting shortcomings of the Code. Since March
14, 1979, at least three bills designed to correct technical errors in, clarify, and make minor
substantive changes to the Code have been put before Congress and have passed in one or
the other house, although none has yet passed in both. S. RaP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1981), reprinted in 1981 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) No. 47, at 5-6 (extra ed.). The first of
these bills was accompanied by a report noting that "ti]t is clear even at this early time in
the life of this law that technical amendments are required." H.R. RzP. No. 1195, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) No. 30 (pt. 2),,at 1. Errors
enumerated in that report include mistakes in printing, spelling, punctuation, grammar,
syntax, and numeration; incongruent provisions left after other material was removed;
Section 522(d) (5)
One such ambiguity pertains to consumer bankruptcy prop-
erty exemptions. Section 522(d)5 of the Code exempts certain
added provisions not completely integrated; and minor substantive matters either over-
looked or postponed at the time of enactment. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1980 BANm. L. REP.
(CCH) No. 30 (pt. 2), at 1-2. The proposed amendments to section 522 in the "technical
amendments" bill currently before Congress are numerous, but pertain primarily to changes
in phraseology to promote clarity and do not affect the issues addressed in this comment.
See S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 38 (1981), reprinted in 1981 BANam L. REP. (CCH) No.
47, at 61-66 (extra ed.). However, S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 127 CONG. RIc. S15,712-
15 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981), introduced in December 1981, provides for the abolition of
federal exemptions altogether.
For commentary on the technical weaknesses of the Code, see, e.g., Butler, supra note 2,
at 573-74; Evans, Recent Developments: Bankruptcy Code, 36 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1260-64
(1981); Kennedy, Foreword: A Brief History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. Ray.
667, 678-79 (1980); Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 769, 783-85, 790, 794-96, 810-12 (1980); Comment, Good Faith in Chap-
ter 13: A New Wild Card for Bankruptcy, 8 Oto N.U.L. REv. 102, 106 (1981).
Two of the Code provisions quoted in this comment contain obvious errors in transcrip-
tion. See infra notes 61, 64, and accompanying text.
5 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980):
The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real property or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a
cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item, in house-
hold furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops,
or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household
use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in jewelry held prima-
rily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused
amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in any
property.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any implements,
professional 'books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of
the debtor.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life
insurance contract.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4,000 less any amount of
property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section 542(d) of this title,
[pertaining to payment for life insurance by means of levy on the estate] in any ac-
crued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any untnatured life insurance con-
tract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individual of
whom the debtor is a dependent.
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assist-
ance benefit;
(B) a veterans' benefit;
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property owned by a bankrupt6 from levy by his creditors.7 Para-
graph (5) of that section provides 'that a debtor may exempt his
"aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus any unused
amount of the [$7500 homestead] exemption provided under para-
graph (1) of this subsection, in any property."8 An overwhelming
majority of courts9 have construed the phrase "any property" to
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an in-
sider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such
plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under [the Internal Revenue
Code].
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the
debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life of an individ-
ual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the date of such individual's death, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor;
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal bodily injury, not
including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent; or
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an indi-
vidual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
6 This comment will use the terms "bankrupt," "debtor," and "consumer bankrupt"
interchangeably, referring in each case to an individual petitioner for personal, as opposed
to business, bankruptcy. An individual may choose between chapters 7 (liquidation, 11
U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. IV 1980)) and 13 (debt adjustment, id. §§ 1301-1330). The exemp-
tions discussed here are relevant only to chapter 7 liquidations.
A bankrupt may choose between state and federal exemptions, unless the state con-
cerned has barred the use of federal exemptions by statute. Id. § 522(b). As of this writing,
19 states had "opted out" of the federal exemption scheme: Alabama, Arizona, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Evans, supra
note 4, at 1261; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (Supp. 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-504(g) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1981).
* 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
* The Code's most controversial changes were to the bankruptcy court system. See
Aaron, supra note 2, at 23-24. Under pre-Code law, federal "referees" presided over bank-
ruptcy courts; their adjudications were appealable to the district courts. The new bank-
ruptcy courts are adjuncts of the federal district courts, and federal bankruptcy judges pre-
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mean literally any property of the debtor's estate without restric-
tion, thus allowing every debtor a $7900 "grubstake"'10 of property
in any form.1" Only two courts, now both overruled, have construed
"any property" to be restricted to property of the types specified
in the other paragraphs of section 522(d),' 2 thus limiting debtors to
those forms of "preferred property" traditionally protected by ex-
side; their decisions are appealable to the circuit courts. The circuit courts may appoint
appellate panels of three bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from the bankruptcy courts.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (Supp. 1I 1979).
The bankruptcy court system is scheduled to become completely effective on April 1,
1984. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978). During the present transi-
tion period, the new system generally is in effect except that the bankruptcy judges have not
yet attained full federal judge status; appeals from bankruptcy judges may be taken by
district courts, appellate panels, or circuit courts; and a pilot "federal trustee" program is in
effect in 14 judicial districts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-585, 587-589 (Supp. III 1979). Full implemen-
tation has been cast in doubt by a recent case holding the bankruptcy judges' broad powers
unconstitutional. Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 Bankr. 946 (D.
Minn. 1981), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981) (No. 81-150).
10 The paragraph (5) exemption under the majority view has been labelled an "unfilled
bin," In re Schuler, 13 Bankr. 478, 478 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1981); "general," Leech v. Nichols,
4 Bankr. 711, 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980); a "grubstake," 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 2, at 1 522.02; a "wildcard," Lindsey, supra note 2, at 371 & n.4; and a "catch-
all," Mapother, supra note 2, at 12.
" In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981); In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 1st
Cir. 1981) (Truth in Lending Act causes of action exempted under paragraph (5)); In re
Schuler, 13 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1981) (income tax refund and sum owed on a
contract for deed exempted); In re Hilbert, 12 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (real es-
tate exempted); Chrystler v. Geresy (In re Brock), 10 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981)
(cause of action for an invalid sale exempted); Taylor v. Industrial Valley Bank, 8 Bankr.
578 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (cash exempted); Smith v. Bank of Glenwood, 8 Bankr. 375
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (cash exempted); In re Brosius, 7 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1980) (miscellaneous items, including four motor vehicles, exempted); In re Lowe, 7 Bankr.
248 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1980) (real estate exempted); Krupp, Meyers & Hoffman v. Doyle
(In re Laird), 6 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (arbitration award exempted); In re
Collins, 5 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (credit union account exempted); Leech v.
Nichols, 4 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980) (income tax refund exempted); In re
Cramer, 3 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980) (privately owned business inventory ex-
empted); In re Upright, 1 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1979) (privately owned business
inventory exempted).
Courts following the majority view in dicta while using paragraph (5) to exempt only
property specified elsewhere in section 522(d) include Travelers Ins. Co. v. Angus, 9 Bankr.
769 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (ring exceeding section 522(d)(4) limit in value); Webber v. Credi-
thrift of Am., Inc., 7 Bankr. 580 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (household goods); Beard v. Dial Plan,
5 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980) (household goods); Credithrift of Am., Inc. v.
Dubrock, 5 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980) (automobile used as a tool of trade); Boozer
v. Kennesaw Fin. Co., 4 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (household goods); Bagley v.
Robert Scott Gordon, Inc., 1 Bankr. 116 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (automobile).
12 In re Smith, 5 Bankr. 500 (C.D. I. 1980), rev'd, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981);
LaFlamme v. Finance Am. Corp., 10 Bankr. 792 (Bankr. D.R.I.), rev'd sub nom. In re La
Flamme, 14 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981).
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emption statutes.13
The disparity in the relative degree of support for these two
views belies both the ambiguity of the statutory language and the
absence of any direct discussion of the issue in the legislative his-
tory. This comment argues that the minority view, though superfi-
cially a countertextual reading of paragraph (5), is in fact closer to
the apparent congressional intent. After outlining the traditional
forms and underlying principles of property exemptions and con-
trasting these concepts with the majority approach, the comment
analyzes the language and legislative history of paragraph (5) and
reviews the practical considerations implicated by the conflicting
interpretations. The comment concludes that Congress intended to
provide the traditional scheme of exemptions authorized by the
minority interpretation of paragraph (5) and that it never en-
dorsed, implicitly or explicitly, the majority grubstake approach.
I. BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS IN HISTORY AND IN CURRENT
PRACTICE
A. Traditional Forms and Principles
Although harsh debt collection procedures have existed since
antiquity,14 exemption of some types of debtor property from cred-
IS Neither the courts nor commentators have attempted to determine the precise effect
of the minority view on the $400 allowance contained within paragraph (5) itself. A rigorous
application of the minority approach would require that the $400 allowance, like the $7500
homestead overflow, be restricted to items specifically enumerated in section 522(d), thereby
denying the debtor any outright cash exemption. A better reading, although one more diffi-
cult to sustain under the statutory language, would provide that "any property" is in fact
nonrestrictive, but extends only to the $400 allowance, while the unused amount of the
homestead exemption is restricted to other specifically exempted property. Under the latter
reading, paragraph (5) closely adheres to the cash or "general" exemption allowances of
many state statutes, see infra note 20, to the liquid assets exemption of the Uniform Ex-
emptions Act ("UEA") that served as the basis for the Code exemptions, see infra notes 72,
93, 96, and accompanying text, and to the reductions imposed by Congress on the other
UEA exemption allowances, see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. Because the
plain words of paragraph (5) in isolation do not support this reading, it is tempting to as-
sume a drafting error, and there is some evidence that supports that assumption. See infra
note 50 and accompanying text. The discussion in this comment applies to both readings
except as indicated infra notes 50, 110.
Professor William Vukowich, though siding with the majority, suggests that paragraph
(5) might be read to bar application of the unused homestead exemption to property speci-
fied in section 522(d), rather than requiring such application as urged by the minority, or
permitting it as urged by the majority. Vukowich, supra note 4, at 780-82. This unlikely
interpretation is rejected under the minority view advocated here, but has some application
to later discussion in this comment. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226,
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itor levy has an equally lengthy history.15 Under English law statu-
tory provision for bankruptcy is a relatively recent phenomenon,
but was early accompanied by some-if minimal-specific property
exemptions. 1
6
American statutes have followed suit. The first three federal
bankruptcy statutes each exempted certain specific items of prop-
erty.17 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the fourth and last pre-Code
bankruptcy statute, incorporated state exemption provisions into
the federal scheme.' 8 Although the state statutes varied widely in
226-27 (1976) (tracing development from 450 B.C. to 1787 of sanctions against debtors, in-
cluding dissection at the option of creditors, debt slavery, imprisonment, and seizure of
property); Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 76 W. VA.
L. REv. 427, 428-34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reflections] (describing historical punish-
ments and stigmatizations of delinquent debtors); Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in
Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Limitations]; Com-
ment, Personal Property Exemptions and the Uniform Exemptions Act, 1978 B.Y.U.L.
REv. 462, 466-67.
1 E.g., Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. Rv.
484, 485 (1961) (citing a Roman civil statute of 312 A.D. that prohibited seizure of agricul-
tural implements, cattle, and slaves when payment of taxes would be delayed, and noting
the "extensive list of exemptions" in the eighteenth century Spanish civil code).
16 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 14, at 227 (noting the development of English
bankruptcy law from 1542 until the first provision for the exemption of wearing apparel and
a conditional sum of cash in 1705); Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779,
782 (1974) ("Under early English common law, canons of decency required exemptions of
debtors' necessary clothing. Later English laws recognized exemptions of bare essentials,
clothing, bedding, and tools of trade, but reflected little tolerance for debtors beyond recog-
nizing the need to preserve some minimal assets for the debtors' survival.") (footnote
omitted).
17 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (repealed 1803), exempted the
wearing apparel and necessary "beds and bedding" of the debtor and his family. The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843), exempted "the necessary
household and kitchen furnishings, and such other articles and necessaries" to an aggregate
value limit of $300, plus the wearing apparel of the debtor and his family. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 522-23 (repealed 1878), allowed exemption of house-
hold and kitchen necessaries to an aggregate value limit of $500; the debtor's wearing ap-
parel, arms, and uniforms; and, most significantly, any other property exempted by state
law.
1s Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6a, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (superceded 1978). Federal
incorporation of varying state exemptions has long been held not to violate the constitu-
tional mandate of "uniform" federal bankruptcy laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, on the
ground that the required uniformity is geographical rather than personal. Exemptions may
vary from state to state as long as they are uniformly applied within a given state. Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1902).
Federal exemptions from creditor levy existed in certain federal nonbankruptcy statutes
concurrent with the 1898 Act and still exist today. Most protect various forms of personal
income, generally that paid by the federal government. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV
1980) (limits on wage garnishment); 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976) (veteran's benefits, also ex-
empted under section 522(d)(9) of the Code); 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) (social security bene-
fits, also exempted under section 522(d)(9) of the Code); 46 U.S.C. § 601 (1976) (wages of
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aggregate property value exempted and in the practicality and mo-
dernity of their exemption provisions, virtually all adhered to the
specified property approach.19 As of 1978, the grubstake approach
was implemented fully in only two states, 0 despite frequent aca-
demic commentary in its favor.2 1
Bankruptcy exemptions traditionally have included the
debtor's homestead, household goods, wearing apparel, and tools of
seamen). Certain federal nonbankruptcy statutes also provide specific property exemptions.
See infra note 32. For a discussion of nonbankruptcy federal exemptions while the 1898 Act
was in effect, see Vukowich, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposal Regarding Bankrupts'
Exemption Rights, 63 CALIF. L. Rv. 1439, 1445-51 (1975).
1" Most commentators criticize state exemption statutes for being outmoded, niggardly,
and confined to rigid property specifications. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANK-
RUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCEss, REFORM 81-84 (1971); Countryman, For a New Exemption Pol-
icy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678, 681-84 (1960); Joslin, Debtors' Exemption
Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355 (1959); Plumb, The Recommendations of
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV.
1, 4-18, 152-53 (1975); Rombauer, supra note 15, at 484; Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A
Full Circle Back to the Act of 18002, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 665-71 (1968); Comment,
Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1465-70 (1959). But
see Vukowich, supra note 16, at 797-832 (arguing that some state statutory exemptions are
too generous). On the history of state exemption statutes, see generally C. WARREN, BANK-
RUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 146-52 (1935); Vukowich, supra note 16, at 783-88.
20 Though now out of date, a good thumbnail sketch of state exemption statutes in
effect at the time of the Code's enactment, without discussion of the homestead exemption
provisions, is provided in A. MILBERG & H. SHAIN, How To Do YOUR OWN BANKRUPTCY 44-
93 (1978). At that time, the constitution of North Carolina exempted $500 of personalty to
be chosen by the debtor, with no other provision for exemption of personal property, N.C.
CONST. art. X, § 1, and Florida debtors were permitted a grubstake of $1000 in a similar
scheme under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.07 (1977) and FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4. The remaining
states and the District of Columbia all specified some categories of exempt personal prop-
erty, although at least one state permitted a choice between a grubstake and specified prop-
erty exemptions. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-504-05 (1980) (permitting choice
of $1000 in "any property" or otherwise specified property). The largest cash (or "general")
exemptions, other than those of the jurisdictions cited immediately above, were Georgia's
$5000 allowance for "any property," Virginia's $3500 allowance, Tennessee's $2500 allow-
ance, and New Mexico's $1500 allowance. See A. MILBERG & H. SHAN, supra, at 44-93. Of
the 51 jurisdictions listed, only 12 had "general" exemptions exceeding $700, while 29 had
no such exemption in any amount. States offering a "general" exemption frequently re-
quired that the debtor exercising the exemption be either a homeowner or head of family
and offered reduced or no exemptions to single debtors. See id.
Since 1978 many states have changed their exemption statutes. The most marked trend
has been to "opt out" of the federal scheme, see supra note 7, but some states have also
made their exemptions more liberal. See, e.g., MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-
504(b)(5) (Supp. 1981) ($3000 in "any property" exempted, up from $1000 in 1978). A com-
pilation of current state exemption statutes without commentary is contained in 1981
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 951.
21 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 19, at 746-48; Plumb, supra note 19, at 18-19, 152-
53; Note, supra note 19, at 671; Comment, supra note 19, at 1507-10. Cf. Joslin, supra note
19, at 358-60 (advocating "semi-flexible" exemptions).
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trade.22 Most modern exemption statutes also contain allowances
for various forms of personal income, life insurance, and a motor
vehicle, but otherwise differ from the traditional statutes only in
their broader definitions of essentially the same "preferred" cate-
gories.23 Allowances for exemptions of cash, other liquid assets, or
"any property" at the debtor's election are not unusual, but are
generally quite small.2
4
Exemptions historically have been perceived as having mutu-
ally supportive humanitarian and practical purposes: protection of
the debtor and his family from destitution, debtor rehabilitation,
and avoidance of the need for direct public support.25 To ensure
that distribution of assets to creditors is reduced as little as possi-
ble, exemptions are minimal, limited to those "necessaries" actu-
ally needed for continued productive existence.26
In the modern context, the justifications of creditor protection
and reduction of the public charge are attenuated by the operation
of the market for consumer credit. The cost of consumer bankrupt-
cies, though apparently falling on those creditors whose claims are
discharged for reduced or no payment,27 is in fact indirectly borne
by society at large. By increasing the price of credit to offset bad
debt losses, creditors disperse the ultimate cost of bankruptcy over
those consumers using credit without default.2 Property exemp-
tions of any kind reduce the pool of debtor assets available for
creditor levy, which increases creditor losses and, therefore, the
cost of credit.2
This modern development does not invalidate the traditional
choices of preferred property, but helps indicate why only certain
property is exempt. By imposing a social cost in the form of an
2 See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 19, at 14-96; Rombauer, supra note 15, at 490-99;
Vukowich, supra note 16, at 797-832.
'3 Vukowich, supra note 16, at 797-832. See also Joslin, supra note 19, at 360, 368-72.
1, Joslin, supra note 19, at 360, 368-72. See also supra note 20.
21 See, e.g., Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs., 5 Bankr. 282, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980),
af'd, 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Centran Bank v. Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395, 401 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1980); Joslin, supra note 19, at 355; Rombauer, supra note 15, at 486; Vukowich,
supra note 16, at 782-88; Comment, supra note 19, at 1502-03.
26 Vukowich, supra note 16, at 831-32; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 771.
17 See, e.g., Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs., 5 Bankr. 282, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980)
(exemption statutes are designed to shift "burdens of social welfare from community to
creditors"), aff'd, 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
28 CREDr RESEARCH CENTER, MONOGRAPH No. 23, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (vol.
1) 91-94 (1982) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY STUDY]; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra
note 19, at 37.
"I Comment, supra note 19, at 1459.
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increased price of credit, consumer bankruptcies present a choice
between increasing that cost by permitting property exemptions
and enabling debtors to remain relatively self-supporting, or reduc-
ing that cost by denying exemptions and undertaking the alterna-
tive cost of supporting impoverished debtors by direct transfer
payment.30 Thus, the choice of what property to exempt is not
based only on the importance of particular items to the debtor in
supporting and rehabilitating himself. In attempting to maximize
social welfare, the choice also should consider the value of the ex-
empted property in the hands of the debtor as compared with its
value when resold by creditors. The traditional forms of exempted
property are almost invariably either items of high replacement
and low resale price, or items having a particular sentimental value
that is unique to the owner and ignored on the open market.
Clothing and household goods, the two oldest forms of preferred
property in bankruptcy, are the classic examples of property meet-
ing both these criteria. Tools of trade have a greater value assem-
bled for the use of a particular tradesman than disbursed for resale
to others. As demonstrated by the common law rule of specific per-
formance in real estate contracts,s1 a homestead is considered a
unique item of property of special value to the owner. The more
debatable property exemptions generally fail to meet clearly the
criterion of greater value in the debtor's hands than in the credi-
tor's. For example, the obvious sentimental value of jewelry is
counterbalanced by its ease of resale; automobiles, once depreci-
ated, arguably are interchangeable and certainly have an estab-
lished resale market; cash and other liquid assets are completely
fungible.
In sum, the conventional forms of exempted property seem
well chosen both to balance the traditional justifications of debtor
protection, creditor payment, and conservation of the fisc, and to
meet the modern concern of maximizing social welfare in the con-
text of consumer credit. As of 1978, all federal, and the overwhelm-
ing majority of state, bankruptcy exemption statutes were limited
to such property. 2
30 Id. at 1497-1502. A third "alternative" would be to reduce debtors to poverty by levy
without providing for any subsequent support. This option obviously is not viable in modern
society.
31 See MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 220, at 441 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
31 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. It is significant that federal nonbank-
ruptcy statutes addressing exemption of tangible property generally provide a detailed spec-
ified property exemption scheme. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a) (1976) (property exempted
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B. Exemptions Under Paragraph (5)
It was against this background that Congress enacted the
Code. The property exemptions it provides are generally of the
traditional types, and the dollar value of most are no more than
average when compared with similar state statutes. 3 The one
striking exception to this rule of moderation is the asserted $7900
grubstake exemption of paragraph (5).34 The majority-view courts
have permitted exemption under paragraph (5) of large amounts of
property not traditionally preferred, including cash amounts of
$800,' 5 $11,000,/ and $14,592;37 privately owned business invento-
ries worth $55828 and $10,000;ss an arbitration award of $6700;40 a
credit union account of $7900;41 unimproved real estate worth
$1350 and $1800;42 rental property worth $15,000;43 and a debtor's
interest in "a 1977 Dodge Van, a cash register, an air pump, a 1963
El Con Mobile Home, a 1969 Kawasaki motorcycle, a 1974 AMC
motor vehicle, and a Macaw parrot, for a total value of $3,500." 4
from tax levy); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (1976 & Supp. II 1979) (property disregarded in calculat-
ing resources of supplemental security income recipients); cf. 45 C.F.R. 233.20(a)(3)(i)
(1980) (property allowances for state welfare program recipients).
33 Hughes, supra note 2, at 1029-30; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 778.
" See cases cited supra note 11; Hughes, supra note 2, at 1030 & n.41. Under the
majority interpretation, paragraph (5) gives all debtors a $7900 "general exemption." In re
Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981). As of 1978, this figure was over 50% larger than
the then-largest state general exemption of $5000, and over 1000% larger than the usual
general exemption, where one existed at all, of less than $700. Twenty-nine states had no
such exemption in any amount. See supra note 20.
Taylor v. Industrial Valley Bank, 8 Bankr. 578, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
' In re Schuler, 13 Bankr. 478, 480 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1981) (total of income tax re-
funds and amount owed on a contract for deed allowed as exempt for joint debtors).
37 Smith v. Bank of Glenwood, 8 Bankr. 375, 377-79 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (total cash
amount allowed as exempt for joint debtors).
" In re Upright, 1 Bankr. 694, 701-02 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1979).
" In re Cramer, 3 Bankr. 428, 429 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980) (joint debtors).
4' Krupp, Meyers & Hoffman v. Doyle (In re Laird), 6 Bankr. 273, 274, 276 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1980) (award accrued prior to filing of bankruptcy petition but paid afterwards).
" In re Collins, 5 Bankr. 675, 676 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
41 In re Lowe, 7 Bankr. 248, 249-51 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1980) (consolidation of two
cases, one holding unimproved real estate exemptable under paragraph (5)).
" In re Hilbert, 12 Bankr. 434, 435-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
" In re Brosius, 7 Bankr. 811, 812 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).
Paragraph (5) also has been employed to exempt "overflow" from the other exemption
provisions of section 522(d), typically to allow additional exemption of household goods and
furnishings, see Webber v. Credithrift of Am., Inc., 7 Bankr. 580, 582 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980);
Beard v. Dial Plan, 5 Bankr. 429, 430 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980); Boozer v. Kennesaw Fin. Co.,
4 Bankr. 524, 526-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); automobiles, see Bagley v. Robert Scott
Gordon, Inc., 1 Bankr. 116, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979); and tools of trade, see Credithrift of
Am., Inc. v. Dubrock, 5 Bankr. 353, 355-56 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980). This use of paragraph
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Although debtors owning such relatively extensive assets are
apparently unusual, 45 these results are strikingly incongruous com-
pared with the traditional "necessaries" exempted in bankruptcy,
and they also find little support in the principles underlying the
exemption of preferred property." Only by limiting a debtor to a
homestead or other preferred property in compiling the maximum
exemption available under paragraph (5)-as does the minority in-
terpretation-are the basic policies supporting exemption of pre-
ferred property vindicated. Under the majority approach, two
debtors who possess radically different amounts of preferred prop-
erty can still receive the same total dollar amount in exemptions; if
this outcome is desirable, it is difficult to understand why the Code
provides a list of preferred property at all." Because the practical
effects of the majority grubstake approach diverge so markedly
from the underlying principles of debtor exemptions, a careful
analysis of the statutory language and legislative history of para-
graph (5) should be made to determine if they compel such un-
likely results.
(5) accords with the approach advocated by the minority-view courts, though the property
categories are sometimes stretched to the outer limits of reasonable definition. E.g., Hager-
man v. Dial Fin. Co., 9 Bankr. 412, 413 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (television set and nonoccu-
pational tools held to be household furnishings absent any indication that they were not
ordinary items found in most households); Coleman v. Lake Air Bank, 5 Bankr. 76, 79
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (stereo system held to be household furnishing "regardless of how
elaborate").
"5 On the variance between the reported cases and the average bankruptcy proceeding,
see Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 403, 405-
09 (1974). See also infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
48 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
Vukowich, supra note 4, at 780-81, was concerned that paragraph (5) might be misin-
terpreted to bar debtors from utilizing the homestead exemption overflow for additional
exemption of property specified in section 522(d). He noted that "the list of property in
section 522(d) is so comprehensive of the types of property that are designed to fulfill the
policy goals of the exemption laws that it would undermine the purpose of the subsection to
require debtors to select unlisted property." Id. at 781. The majority view, which permits
rather than requires debtors to retain unlisted property, is objectionable for the same rea-
son: both views "undermine the purposes of the subsection." In contrast, the minority ap-
proach encourages retention, and even acquisition, of preferred property, because debtors
are permitted to exchange nonexempt property on the eve of bankruptcy. See infra note 101
and accompanying text. The majority approach is indifferent to this important policy. Judge
Hughes has observed:
The policy implication of the merger of the residential allowance and the unrestricted
exemption is that highly favored property, such as a homestead or burial plot, receives
the same treatment under section 522(d) as less favored property such as country club
memberships, ski cabins, gambling casino chips, wine cellars, and yachts.
Hughes, supra note 2, at 1031 (footnotes omitted).
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II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Arguing that bankruptcy statutes are to be construed liber-
ally,"" the majority courts simply and persuasively contend that
the plain language of paragraph (5) exempts "any property" with-
out limitation."9 Paragraph (5), examined in isolation, provides no
immediately apparent statutory ground on which to oppose this
position,50 for courts should construe statutory language according
48 E.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Ancira, 5 Bankr. 673, 674
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980). This general principle is of little practical use in statutory interpre-
tation and its meaning is diluted by dicta equally vague but different in effect. See, e.g., In
re Time Sales Fin. Corp., 474 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1971) (one of the "chief purposes" of
bankruptcy law is to effect an efficient settlement of the debtor's estate); Quigley v. Kim-
brough, 395 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1968) ("the broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to
bring about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate") (quoting United States v.
Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959)); Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d
975, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1966) ("our guidelines of interpretation are relatively narrow" when
construing a bankruptcy exemption for insurance). More significantly, much of the case law
involving liberal construction of bankruptcy exemption statutes originated between 1898
and 1978, when exemptions were governed by state law and the federal courts were con-
strained by a deference inapplicable to the construction of federal law. See, e.g., Williams v.
Wirt, 423 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1970) ("In applying the exemption laws of a state the
federal courts follow the construction placed thereon by the courts of the state.") (citations
omitted). See also Holahan & Hemmings, Judicial Expansions of Exemptions in Bank-
ruptcy, 80 CoM. L.J. 102, 103 (1975) (federal courts purporting "to control and vary the
state law of property" in bankruptcy violate the federal bankruptcy statute). Additionally,
liberal construction of state exemption statutes was necessitated in part by their frequently
outmoded or niggardly property specifications. See Kennedy, Limitations, supra note 14, at
448 & n.13; Note, supra note 19, at 670. This last consideration is no longer valid, given the
modernity and liberality of the exemption provisions of the Code.
49 See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that "Congress
meant to give the general exemption as broad an application as the language it chose"); In
re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21, 22-23 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981) (unlikely that the phrase "any
property" would have been chosen to indicate an intent to "limit the application of the
subsection"); Taylor v. Industrial Valley Bank, 8 Bankr. 578, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)
(absent express language to the contrary, "common sense dictates that the phrase 'any prop-
erty' includes cash").
5o A ground not immediately apparent is the substantial possibility that paragraph (5)
contains a drafting error. This suggestion is made plausible not only by the existence of the
ambiguity itself, but also by the fact that paragraph (5) was drafted as a deviation from the
otherwise comprehensive scheme of the Uniform Exemptions Act, see infra notes 72, 93, 96,
and accompanying text, and thus it is all too likely that the section was poorly integrated
with the surviving provisions. Furthermore, the one direct explanation of paragraph (5) pro-
vided by Congress sets off the general exemption from the unused portion of the homestead
exemption with a comma, while the statute as enacted did not contain the comma. Compare
infra text accompanying note 96 with supra note 5. With the comma present, the text more
easily supports an allowance of a $400 general exemption without restriction, and a home-
stead overflow exemption restricted to the property specified in section 522(d). See supra
note 13. An error in transcription involving a comma, as well as far more serious drafting
shortcomings, is not unlikely given the widely recognized failings of the Code's language.
See supra note 4.
The University of Chicago Law Review
to its plain meaning in light of common usage whenever possible. 1
Paragraph (5) cannot, however, be analyzed in a vacuum.2
A. Section 522
When paragraph (5) is viewed within the context of section
522, the analysis becomes more complex. First, some significance
should attach to the placement of paragraph (5) within a series of
paragraphs listing exempt property.53 Second, section 522(b)(1)
provides that a debtor taking the federal exemptions may exempt
only "property that is specified under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion. ' 54 The term "specified" suggests that reference should be
made to the specific enumeration of property found in the eleven
paragraphs of section 522(d). Property not specifically listed
therein is arguably not "property" within the meaning of the sec-
tion. Although no majority court has countered this argument di-
rectly,55 the most likely response is that $7900. of "any property" is
itself a specific listing despite its indefinite components. This re-
sponse is unsatisfying, however, in the face of the painstaking
specificity displayed in the other exemptions in section 522(d).
This very specificity suggests a third argument in favor of the
51 "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citation omitted).
52 "[W]e must always be mindful that the interpretation of a statute should not hinge
on an isolated clause or phrase in a particular section, but should consider the whole statute
as well as the objects and policy behind its enactment." In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. 337, 339
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)).
'3 LaFlamme v. Finance Am. Corp., 10 Bankr. 792, 793, 794 (Bankr. D.R.L), rev'd sub
nom. In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981). Under the principle of ejusdem
generis, the "any property" term of paragraph (5) could be restricted to only those forms of
property enumerated in the preceding four paragraphs, most of which fall into the tradi-
tional categories of exempted property. See text of statute, supra note 5. The related canon
of noscitur a sociis suggests that paragraph (5) "property" is confined to the subject matter
of the references that surround it-the specific property exemptions of section 522(d).
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
" In Leech v. Nichols, 4 Bankr. 711, 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980), the court appar-
ently was presented with the argument that section 522(b)(1) restricts paragraph (5) "other
property" to property exempted under either state or federal law. The court noted that the
argument "carries weight and is appealing in certain respects," but rejected it on the ground
that the Code clearly presents state and federal exemptions as alternatives. Id. at 715-16.
Later in the opinion, the court also rejected the section 522(b)(1) argument without refer-
ence to state law, stating only that such an interpretation "burdens unduly the meaning
suggested by the dictionary definition and common usage of the english [sic] language." Id.
at 717. The opinion therefore fails to stat4 exactly what argument was presented in support
of the minority, but in any event it does not specifically refute the argument based on sec-
tion 522(b)(1).
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minority view. The majority interpretation of paragraph (5) ren-
ders the homestead exemption of section 522(d)(1) superfluous be-
cause its $7500 allowance is incorporated into paragraph (5)'s ex-
emption of "any property.""8 Such a result violates the principle
that a statute must be read so as to avoid making any portion su-
perfluous. 57 The result is particularly incongruous given the de-
tailed property descriptions and limitations evident in all other
paragraphs of section 522(d), but unaccountably abandoned in par-
agraph (5)"--even though that paragraph contains potentially the
largest single exemption in section 522(d).5 9 This criticism of the
majority approach has been met only with the lame observation
that" 'even the most basic general principles of statutory construc-
tion must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.' "60
B. Sections 522 and 541
Section 541(a)(1) defines "[p]roperty of the estate" to be "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case."61 Several of the majority-view courts have
" LaFlamme v. Finance Am. Corp., 10 Bankr. 792, 794 (Bankr. D.R.I.), rev'd sub noma.
In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981); Hughes, supra note 2, at 1031.
'7 "In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Con-
gress used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (citation omitted).
" But see Chrystler v. Geresy (In re Brock), 10 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1981):
As for the argument that a "spillover" is inconsistent with the careful delineation of
types and amounts of property exemptable under the other provisions of Section
522(d), one can think of many cases where there would be no inconsistency at all, in-
volving debtors with homestead equities equalling or exceeding the amounts allowed by
Section 522(d)(1). It was also rational for Congress to allow the "spillover" for debtors
with little or no homestead equity ....
This argument, though forcefully made, begs the question. Both the majority and the mi-
nority views provide a "spillover" for all debtors. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying
text.
5, The $7900 amount in paragraph (5) is larger than any other specified in section
522(d). The only comparable amounts are the $7500 personal injury award exemption in
paragraph 11(d) and the $4000 life insurance contract exemption in paragraph (8). The
$7500 homestead exemption of paragraph (1) is, of course, included in paragraph (5).
" In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21, 25 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981) (quoting National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)).
61 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part:
§541. Property of the estate
(a) The commencement of a case under under [sic] section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title [pertaining to voluntary, joint, and involuntary cases] creates an estate. Such es-
tate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section [pertaining
to trusts], all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
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stressed that there is no reason to differentiate between the uses of
the term "property" in section 541 and in section 522, and that the
all-inclusive definition in section 541 thus applies to paragraph (5)
as well.62
There are three responses to this contention. First, section 541
only provides for and defines "[p]roperty of the estate"; it makes
no reference to section 522 or to property exemptions. Thus its ap-
plicability to section 522 in general and to paragraph (5) in partic-
ular is far from clear.6 3 Second, even if it were to be argued that
section 541 implicitly refers to section 522, Congress took special
care to avoid such definitional transplants. The "Rules of Con-
struction" contained in section 102 provide that "a definition, con-
tinued [sic] in a section of this title that refers to another section
of this title, does not, for the purpose of such reference, affect the
meaning of a term used in such other section."'" Third, section 101
of the Code contains a list of definitions that apply throughout the
Code, and "property" is not included among those defined terms. 5
mencement of the case.
62 See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 890-92 (7th Cir. 1981); Leech v. Nichols, 4
Bankr. 711, 717 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980) (" 'Property,' as modified by the words 'of the
estate' and the word,'any' cannot have such radically different meanings.").
63 Section 522 does contain a reference to section 541, but it is not helpful to the major-
ity position. Section 522(b) provides that a debtor may exempt property in accordance with
section 522(d) or the appropriate state law, "[n]otwithstanding section 541 of this title." 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. IV 1980). The use of the term "notwithstanding" indicates that sec-
tion 541 has no direct bearing on the determination of exemptions under section 522.
6- 11 U.S.C. § 102(8) (Supp. IV 1980). This provision contains eight rules, the last of
which is cited here. The error indicated generally is read as "contained." COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 2, at app. 1 § 102(8). Rule (8) was inserted into the proposed text of the
Code during the final reconciliation of the competing House and Senate versions. See infra
note 92 and accompanying text. For a rather opaque explanation of the rule, see 124 CONG.
REc. 32,392, 32,393-94 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6436, 6440.
65 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980). Forty terms are defined in this section, including
such basic terms as "claim," id. § 101(4); "creditor," id. § 101(9); "debt," id. § 101(11);
"debtor," id. § 101(12); and "person," id. § 101(30). The omission of the term "property"
from such an inclusive list suggests that the term is not intended to have only one specific
meaning throughout the Code.
It should be noted that elsewhere in the Code, "property" is defined differently than in
section 541. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (Supp. IV 1980) provides that the "[p]roperty of
the estate" applicable to debt adjustments contains, "in addition to the property specified
in section 541 of this title," interests that the debtor acquires after the commencement of
the case. Although this additional definition does not support the minority position directly
in that it is broader than that of section 541, it does suggest that the definition of property
in section 541 does not extend throughout the Code.
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because the statutory language does not compel the majority
interpretation and in fact offers adequate support for the minority
view, the majority courts have relied primarily on the Code's legis-
lative history.6 That history, though not dispositive, is in fact
more supportive of the minority view.
A. Enactment of the Code
The legislative history of the Code makes very little useful ref-
erence either to exemptions in general or to paragraph (5) in par-
ticular. Contrary to the expectations of the Code's sponsors,67 ex-
emptions went virtually unmentioned in congressional floor
debate, 8 and the precise point at issue here was never conclusively
addressed in any report or hearing.6 9 Consequently, the "legislative
intent" behind paragraph (5) can only be inferred from an exami-
nation of the several legislative proposals and the few explicit,
though inconclusive, comments and provisions pertaining to
exemptions.
Two major legislative proposals on general bankruptcy law re-
" See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Our holding is based pri-
marily on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."); In re LaFlamme,
14 Bankr. 21, 23 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981) ("should there be any question as to any ambiguity
in the statute, particularly the phrase 'any property', the legislative history provides compel-
ling evidence that the words 'any property' were purposely selected by the drafters"). The
minority courts also have relied on legislative history. In re Smith, 10 Bankr. 792, 794 (C.D.
]MI. 1980), rev'd, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981); LaFlamme v. Finance Am. Corp., 10 Bankr.
792, 794 (Bankr. D.R.I.), rev'd sub nom. In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. 1st Cir.
1981).
67 See Proposed New Federal Bankruptcy Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 247, 265-66 (1976). House
subcommittee counsel and panel member Alan Parker predicted that "[e]xemptions will
give the Congress a great deal of difficulty." Id. at 265.
"s The two issues that attracted most congressional attention were the reorganization of
the bankruptcy courts and the discharge of student educational loans. See Butler, supra
note 2, at 563-64; Proposed New Federal Bankruptcy Act, supra note 67, at 265 (House
subcommittee counsel's opinion that discharge of student loans had excited more public
interest than any other aspect of bankruptcy reform). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 132-62 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6093-
123 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; 124 CONG. REC. 1791-98 (1978) (debate on student
loans); 123 CONG. REC. 35,673-93 (1977) (debate on status of bankruptcy courts).
" This absence of discussion or, apparently, interest, in itself suggests that the tradi-
tional approach to exemptions-that of the minority-may be the more plausible. On heav-
ily debated topics, Congress's approach was in general conservative. See Aaron, supra note
2, at 22-25, 28 (describing compromise on bankruptcy court reform and decision to retain
existing law on discharge of student loans). If one assumes that this approach extended to
areas that went unmentioned, the more conservative reading of paragraph (5) is supported,
if not clearly vindicated.
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form were placed before Congress: a draft statute prepared by the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ("Com-
mission Bill")70 and a competing draft prepared by the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges ("Judges Bill").7 1 A third propo-
sal, addressing only exemptions and never formally proposed as a
bill, was the Uniform Exemptions Act ("UEA"), prepared by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.72
Each of these proposals adopted an exemption scheme of specified
property, added some novel exemptions to the traditional catego-
ries, and either avoided or explicitly rejected the grubstake
approach.
The Commission Bill enumerated seven general categories of
exempt property,73 including a $5000 homestead exemption.7 ' The
Judges Bill contained a list of exempt property modeled on that of
the Commission Bill, but differed in providing a homestead exemp-
tion of $6000,75 an aggregate value limitation of $25,000 for all ex-
emptions, 7  and the option of taking state exemptions instead of
federal exemptions.7 7 Both bills contained an "in lieu of home-
stead" exemption limited to a restrictive list of property,78 and
70 Congress created the Commission in 1970 to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recom-
mend changes" to federal bankruptcy law. Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 468, 468
(1970). Three years later the Commission produced a report suggesting changes to the bank-
ruptcy laws and including the draft statute hereinafter cited as "Commission Bill." REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuprcy LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137 (2
vols.), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUTrcY, supra note 2, app.
2 [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission Bill was introduced in Con-
gress in identical form as H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 33,430 (1973);
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 145 (1975); and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REc. 641 (1975).
71 This bill was introduced in Congress in identical form as H.R. 16,643, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 30,970 (1974); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 145
(1975); and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. RPc. 641 (1975). For a side-by-side
comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges Bill, see Bankruptcy Act Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, app. 1, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sesss. (1975-76) [herein-
after cited as House Hearings].
71 Uniform Exemptions Act (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws 1976),
reprinted in 13 U.L.A. 365 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UEA]. The UEA was amended in
1979, but the amendments are not material to this comment; all references herein are to the
1976 version.
73 Commission Bill, supra note 70, § 4-503.
- Id. § 4-503(b)(1).
75 Judges Bill, supra note 71, § 4-503(b).
76 Id. § 4-503(a).
7 Id.
78 The Commission Bill provided:
(b) Homestead or Property in Lieu Thereof.-
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both provided for a liquid assets exemption of only $500.7e The
UEA enumerated five general categories of exempt property subdi-
vided into numerous specific items.80 A debtor claiming the pro-
posed $10,000 homestead exemption could exempt $500 in any liq-
uid assets, while a debtor not claiming the homestead exemption
was allowed $1500 in any liquid assets to assist in the payment of
rent.81 The comments accompanying the UEA specifically rejected
the grubstake approach." None of these three proposals made any
(1) An individual debtor shall be allowed an exemption of property which he
owned and was used at the date of the petition as a home for the debtor, his
spouse, or a dependent or any or all of them. The aggregate value so allowable
shall not exceed $5,000 plus $500 for each dependent of the debtor.
(2) If no property is allowed as exempt under paragraph (1) or if the property
allowed has an aggregate value less than the maximum allowed under paragraph
(1), an individual debtor shall be allowed additional exemptions of property of the
kinds described in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (c) until the aggregate value
of such additional property and property allowed as exempt under paragraph (1)
of this subdivision equals the maximum value allowable under paragraph (1).
(c) Other Property.-The following property shall be allowed as exempt in addi-
tion to any property allowed as exempt under subsection (b):
(1) Livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the
trade or profession, and motor vehicles, to the aggregate value of not more $1,000.
(2) A burial plot to the value of $2,500.
Commission Bill, supra note 70, § 4-503.
Under the Judges Bill, a debtor who did not take the full homestead exemption was
"allowed additional exemptions of property of the kinds described in clause (1) of subsec-
tion (e) of this section until the aggregate value of such additional property" reached the
unused portion of the homestead exemption. Judges Bill, supra note 71, § 4-503(d). Subsec-
tion (e)(1) exempted "livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of
trade or business, and motor vehicles." Id. § 4-503(e)(1).
7' Commission Bill, supra note 70, § 4-503(c)(3); Judges Bill, supra note 71, § 4-
503(e)(2).
80 UEA, supra note 72, §§ 4-8.
81 Id. § 8(d). The comments to this section explained:
Subsection (d) recognizes the appropriateness of an additional allowance for an indi-
vidual who claims no homestead exemption by allowing him a $1500 exemption in liq-
uid assets. The liquid assets so allowed may be applied to prepayment of rent but need
not be so used in order to be available as an exemption.
S" IT]he Act rejects the view that property of a delinquent debtor should be insulated
from levy up to a certain value irrespective of its nature. The Uniform Exemptions Act,
like Section 4-503 of the proposed Bankruptcy Act, introduced in the 93d and 94th
Congresses, thus does not reflect the view that every debtor is entitled to a minimum
grubstake for whatever purpose may please him. Rather the premise of the Act is that
in order for a debtor's property to be protected against compulsory application to the
payment of his indebtedness, it must be used, or be adaptable for use, in ways and for
purposes deemed on balance to be preferable to such application. These ways and pur-
poses have a perceived relation to the provision of shelter, clothing and other necessi-
ties of daily living in this country.
UEA, supra note 72, prefatory note. Academic sources cited in the UEA commentary that
argue to the contrary are Joslin, supra note 19, at 362-75; Vukowich, supra note 16, at 829;
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provision for the exemption of an unspecified category of "any
property."
The statements concerning exemptions presented in the con-
gressional hearings8 were more varied. The exemption schemes in
the Commission and Judges Bills were described and defended by
their drafters84 and enjoyed strong support.8 5 The grubstake ap-
proach was urged by representatives from the Brookings Insti-
tute,86 the Consumer Law Center, 7 and the Bureau of Consumer
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission. 8 Others argued for
continuation of existing law." These statements generally were re-
ceived without comment.
The first purely congressional product addressing exempted
property was H.R. 6,90 a compromise bill based on the Commission
Bill, the Judges Bill, and the UEA.9 1 Although H.R. 6 was followed
by numerous successors, compromises, and reconciliations,92 it pro-
Note, supra note 19, at 671-83; and Comment, supra note 19, at 1507-14. The drafters were
concerned in part over the expense of a complete property appraisal in every bankruptcy.
UEA, supra note 72, § 8 comment 2.
83 In 1975, both houses of Congress began hearings on the Commission, Judges, and
UEA proposals. The most extensive took place before a House subcommittee chaired by
Representative Don Edwards. House Hearings, supra note 71. The subcommittee produced
over 2500 pages of hearing records, id., a line-by-line comparison of the Commission and
Judges Bills, id. at app. 1, and a compilation of all bankruptcy legislation prior to 1975, id.
at supp. app. pts. 1-2. See also The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 71, at 184-85, 192-93, 284-86, 359, 1282, 1305;
Senate Hearings, supra note 83, at 24-25, 29, 36, 41, 61-62, 96-97, 120-21.
8" See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 71, at 898, 909, 977-78, 1025, 1369, 1394, 1658,
1663-64, 2094, 2117-18; Senate Hearings, supra note 83, at 127-28, 135-36, 145-46, 477, 483,
489, 537.
86 See House Hearings, supra note 71, at 369; Senate Hearings, supra note 83, at 877.
The Institute was represented by coauthors David Stanley and Marjorie Girth. See supra
note 19.
87 See House Hearings, supra note 71, at 937-41, 945-46; Senate Hearings, supra note
83, at 309-11, 323, 333-39.
88 See House Hearings, supra note 71, at 762-64, 787-88, 864-65, 884-85.
89 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 71, at 1622, 1674; Senate Hearings, supra note
83, at 433, 630-34, 665-66, 814-21.90 H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 125 (1977).
91 The production of the House compromise bill is described in detail by Klee, supra
note 2, at 279-81. Klee was one of two draftsmen of the bill. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at
675 n.41. The deliberations and memoranda of the congressional committees involved in the
enactment of the Code are not available for study other than as presented in the official
legislative history. Letter from Representative Peter Rodino (Dec. 1, 1981) (on file with The
University of Chicago Law Review).
92 H.R. 6 was followed by two versions having essentially the same exemption provi-
sions. H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 15,941 (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.,
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vided for exemptions identical to those in the Code as enacted, ex-
cept that in the Code the dollar amounts per exemption category
were reduced,9 a "family heirlooms" category was struck,"" and
the state option to deny use of the federal exemptions was added.9 5
The property exemptions of H.R. 6 were also virtually identi-
cal to those of the UEA, except that the UEA's "in lieu of home-
stead" provision, which concerned liquid assets only, was replaced
by what is now paragraph (5). The sole congressional explanation
for this change is in the report accompanying the final House ver-
sion of the bill. In a section-by-section analysis, the report, noting
that the exemptions were "derived in large part from the Uniform
Exemptions Act," states that "paragraph (5) permits the exemp-
tion of $500, plus any unused amount of the homestead exemption,
in any property, in order not to discriminate against the nonhome-
owner." 6 Because paragraph (5) survived without significant
change,97 the report is relevant to its interpretation; no other direct
reference to paragraph (5) exists in the Code's voluminous legisla-
tive history.
B. The Arguments
This slim basis of pertinent legislative history has given rise to
three arguments by the majority-view courts. These rest on the
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 35,644 (1977). H.R. 8200 was accompanied by an extensive sub-
committee report and section-by-section analysis. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68. The Sen-
ate prepared a substantially different bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
36,091 (1977), and a report, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
In 1978 a compromise bill, based primarily on H.R. 8200, was reported to both houses
in coordinated statements by its sponsors. 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6436; 124 CONG. REc. 33,990
(1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6505.
The bill was enacted into law on October 6, 1978. 124 CONG. REc. 34, 143-45 (1978).
93 Compare H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 125 (1977) with 11 U.S.C. §
522(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The amounts corresponding to the Code paragraphs were: para-
graph (1), $10,000 proposed/$7500 enacted; (2), $1500/$1200; (3), $300/$200; (4), $750/$500;
(5), $500/$400; (6), $1000/$750; (8), $5000/$4000; (11)(D), no limit/$7500. The figures pro-
posed in H.R. 6 correspond in every instance to those in the UEA.
" H.R. 7330 and H.R. 8200 eliminated the heirloom provision of H.R. 6.
,1 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6436, 6452-53; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
,1 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 5963, 6317.
" The sole changes in paragraph (5) between the House report and the enactment of
the Code consisted of a reduction of the exemption amounts from $10,000 and $500 to $7500
and $400, respectively. See supra note 93.
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House report's statement concerning discrimination against
nonhomeowners, on the unenacted legislative proposals, and on
Congress's oft-stated concern for giving debtors a "fresh start."
1. Discrimination. The majority-view courts frequently have
noted that paragraph (5) was designed specifically to prevent dis-
crimination against the nonhomeowner9e The majority approach
provides a superficially appealing means of preventing such dis-
crimination: debtors with and without homesteads are permitted
the same $7900 grubstake; every debtor thus has access to the
same total dollar value of property, if not to the same forms of
property."' However, the minority approach also prevents discrimi-
nation against homeowners: a debtor not exercising the homestead
exemption can exempt larger dollar amounts of those forms of
8 E.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 & n.17 (7th Cir. 1981); In re LaFlamme, 14
Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981); Leech v. Nichols, 4 Bankr. 711, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980); In re Upright, 1 Bankr. 694, 702 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1979).
"The general exemption was intended to ensure that there was no discrimination be-
tween homeowners and non-homeowners .... By permitting non-homeowners (or
homeowners with property valued under $7500) to exempt the unused portion of the
homestead exemption, plus $400, Congress in effect gave all debtors potentially the
same $7,900 stake.... [T]he Code as enacted permits the use of "any property.". ..
In view of Congress' goal of providing a meaningful fresh start for debtors, it makes no
sense to limit the type of property that may be applied to the general exemption with-
out a clear statement of Congressional intent to do so.
In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
This argument, though appealing, proves too much; complete adherence to it would
have required Congress to provide that the unused portion of every exemption apply to
"any property," and there is of course no such provision. If the minority view's limitation of
the homestead overflow "makes no sense," it was equally unreasonable for Congress to dis-
regard completely the potential overflows from the aggregate value exemptions for a motor
vehicle ($1200), jewelry ($500), tools of trade ($750), life insurance ($4000), and personal
injury awards ($7500), which together total $13,950. See text of section 522(d), supra note 5.
Congressional intent to avoid discrimination against nonhomeowners is clear, but under the
majority interpretation of paragraph (5), that intent can only be achieved by further dis-
crimination against debtors not owning the full amount of each of the other above-listed
types of property. Although the minority view also does not eliminate the apparently inequi-
table distinction between the homestead exemption and all other exemptions in section
522(d), it does minimize the inequitable effect of that distinction by restricting all debtors
to the specified exemptions, thereby reducing the "spread" of potentially exemptable
property.
Several commentators have noted that the Code, and indeed virtually all existing ap-
proaches to property exemption in bankruptcy, are discriminatory per se in that those debt-
ors with property are favored over those without. See, e.g., Donnelly, The New (Proposed?)
Bankruptcy Act: The Development of Its Structural Provisions and their Impact on the
Interests of Consumer-Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291, 331-32 (1978); Plumb, supra
note 19, at 96 & n. 575; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 770-71. This feature is not inconsistent
with the traditional rationale behind property exemptions, nor does it provide any apparent
reason for abandoning the "preferred" property concept in favor of the grubstake approach.
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property specified as exempt in subsection 522(d) than can a
debtor claiming any part of the homestead exemption. Again, each
category of debtor has access to the same total dollar value of
property, if not to identical forms of property.100
Furthermore, Congress expressly permitted debtors to con-
tinue the pre-Code practice of exchanging nonexempt for exempt
property on the "eve of bankruptcy."101 This opportunity virtually
eliminates the discrimination among owners of differing types of
property that is implicit in any scheme of specific exemptions and
in effect serves to encourage debtor acquisition of preferred prop-
erty.102 Congressional notice and approval of this practice not only
verifies that Congress intended to avoid discrimination to the ex-
tent possible, but suggests that Congress envisioned achieving non-
discrimination within a scheme of specified exemptions and by
means of eve-of-bankruptcy exchanges where necessary.
Thus the majority and minority approaches both achieve the
congressional goal of nondiscrimination. The majority approach,
however, does so by extending exempt status to property not gen-
erally preferred or listed in the Code. This is inconsistent both
with the congressional intent implicit in the enumeration of pre-
ferred property exemptions 03 and with congressional endorsement
of eve-of-bankruptcy acquisitions of preferred property. The mi-
nority view, in contrast, is consistent with the implicit congres-
sional intent to provide special protection to certain preferred
debtor property and encourages exchanges on the eve of
bankruptcy.
2. The Proposals Not Enacted. Several courts have argued
that Congress's failure to enact the Commission, Judges, or UEA
proposals corresponding to paragraph (5), coupled with its adop-
tion of an apparently different scheme, constituted a rejection of
those proposals and, consequently, a rejection of the minority ap-
proach.10 4 A number of considerations, however, indicate that the
10" It should be noted that neither the majority nor the minority approach requires a
debtor with a homestead to use the homestead exemption rather than using paragraph (5)
to exempt other forms of property of equal value.
101 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6317.
202 See supra note 47.
103 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
1'4 See, e.g., In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted):
We find it significant, however, that Congress rejected [the UEA] formula-and, as
noted earlier, the specific limitations of the general exemption in the Commission's
draft bill-and substituted instead the broad phrase "any property." If Congress had
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significance of this "rejection" has been misinterpreted.
a. The UEA. Congress explicitly noted that the Code exemp-
tions were based in large part on the UEA and that it wanted to
avoid discrimination against nonhomeowners. 105 However, the
UEA did discriminate against nonhomeowners: it allowed them
only a $1000 increase in the liquid assets exemption as against a
loss of $10,000 in the homestead exemption.106 It therefore was
necessary to modify or replace the UEA's "in lieu of homestead"
provision. Even if modified to allow identical total exemptions for
homeowners and nonhomeowners, however, the provision still
would have provided only an all-or*nothing choice between the ex-
emption of a homestead of indeterminate value and a fixed dollar
amount of liquid assets.10 7 These considerations called for an out-
right replacement of the UEA provision. In any event, because the
provision itself directly adopted neither the majority nor the mi-
nority approach, its rejection can cast little light on the present
debate.
The other major congressional modifications to the UEA pro-
posal, however, are revealing. Congress altered the dollar amount
of all the UEA exemptions included in the Code. Under the major-
ity approach, these alterations are oddly asymmetric: the Code
shows approximately a 500 % increase in the value of the "general"
exemption, but a 20-60% decrease in every other exemption.108
intended to limit the property usable under the general exemption, it certainly had
examples of how it could have done so.
See also Chrystler v. Geresy (In re Brock), 10 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981).
105 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
107 The original UEA scheme provided homeowners a homestead exemption of $10,000
and a liquid assets exemption of $500, while nonhomeowners were granted a liquid assets
exemption of $1500 only. UEA, supra note 72, §§ 4(a), 8(d). Equalizing the liquid assets
exemption for the two classes of debtors, even at the amount of $10,000, would not have
solved the problem of a debtor with a homestead worth less than the total allowable liquid
assets exemption, nor would it have permitted either homestead or liquid asset exemption
overflow to be reassigned to other forms of property. By restricting the debtor to a choice of
either the homestead or the larger liquid asset exemption, the UEA "in lieu of homestead"
provision would produce debtors with unequal total exemptions.
1o8 These percentages were determined as follows:
Exemption UEA §/amount Code §/amount % change
homestead 4 /$10,000 522(d)(1)/$7500 -25%
motor vehicle 8(c)/$1500 522(d)(2)/$1200 -20%
household goods 8(a)/$500 per item 522(d)(3)/$200 per item -60%
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Given the marked and intended similarity of the Code and UEA
exemption provisions, it is difficult to explain such a large devia-
tion both from the UEA scheme and from Congress's consistent
reductions of the dollar values of the UEA exemptions. 10 9 It seems
unlikely that Congress intended to increase the cash exemption for
those not claiming a homestead exemption to more than five times
the most generous figure proposed, while reducing every other ex-
emption allowance.110 Under the minority view, Congress's modifi-
general 8(d)/$500 "liquid assets" 522(d)(5)/$400 "any property" -20%
w/home wlhome
/$1500 w/o /$7900 w/o +527%
tools of trade 8(c)/$1000 522(d)(6)/$750 -25%
life insurance 7 /$1500 522(d)(8)/$4000 less debt indeterminate
personal injury 6 /necessary for support 522(d)(11)/$7500 indeterminate
These figures demonstrate that the Code's "general" exemption was not simply in-
creased to counterbalance the decreases in all other exemptions from the UEA amounts.
The paragraph (5) figures originally proposed were derived from the UEA cash and home-
stead exemption amounts for homeowners (there being no need to adopt the UEA cash
exemption for nonhomeowners given the intent to equalize the two classes of debtor) of
$500 and $10,000 respectively, which were reduced to $400 and $7500 respectively. All other
fixed value exemptions in the Code were similarly reduced.
109 It is possible that the House subcommittee may have been aware of the precise ex-
tent of the Code's deviation from the UEA and earlier proposals, while Congress as a whole
may not have been. The aims and intentions of a congressional committee, however, are not
to be equated with congressional intent, SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-21 (1978), and it
would appear that this restrictive view extends to the staff of a subcommittee and includes
the drafters of a piece of legislation. The question is of some importance, because at least
one of the draftsmen of the Code, Kenneth Klee, agrees with the majority interpretation of
paragraph (5). See Cohen & Klee, Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 681, 693 (1980).
Even apart from the Sloan holding, Mr. Mee's views are not entitled to great weight,
for they were offered ex post. See Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 581 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1978),
aff'd per curiam in relevant part, 590 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
970 (1979); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,
49 U. Cm. L. Rav. 263, 275 (1982).
110 As noted supra note 13, the minority view can be interpreted as eliminating any
cash or general exemption. Even under such a restrictive interpretation, however, there still
is far less deviation from the consistent treatment of UEA exemption allowances than under
the majority view: a cash allowance of zero differs from the largest UEA cash exemption
figure of $1500 by $1500, while a cash allowance of $7900 under the majority view differs
from that same standard by $6400. Still, elimination of the cash exemption is a qualitative
as well as quantitative change. Therefore, the alternative minority reading of paragraph (5),
in which a cash or general exemption of $400 is permitted but the homestead overflow of up
to $7500 is restricted to the exemption of property specified in section 522(d), seems more
plausible. Under this reading, the cash exemption is reduced by 20% from the $500 permit-
ted homeowners in the UEA and thus is entirely consistent with the general range of reduc-
tions of the UEA allowances.
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cations to the UEA exemption allowances are far more consistent.
b. The Commission and Judges Bills. The "in lieu of home-
stead" provisions of the Commission and Judges Bills adhered to
the minority approach,""" and Congress's failure to use either is
less easily explained than its abandonment of the UEA provision.
It is probable that once it chose the UEA as a framework, Congress
simply disregarded the exemption provisions of the Commission
and Judges Bills altogether. Assuming that Congress did analyze
those other bills carefully, however, their "in lieu of homestead"
provisions were poorly designed for insertion into the UEA
scheme. The Commission and Judges Bills applied the unused por-
tion of the homestead exemption to categories of exempted prop-
erty that were organized differently than those of the UEA and
that generally had aggregate value limitations, as opposed to the
per-item or no value limitations placed on the same approximate
categories under the UEA. 112 More significantly, the Commission
and Judges Bills restricted the homestead overflow to a limited
number of specified exemptions rather than to all specified exemp-
tions as urged here.""' The congressional.decision to apply the "in
lieu of homestead" provision to "any property" thus would seem
merely to extend the restrictive language of the Commission and
Judges Bills to all exempted property, and not to any property
whatever. That the provision was made broader does not mean it
was made as broad as possible.
In sum, it seems that the decision to adopt a newly drafted "in
lieu of homestead" provision constituted a rejection only of the
particular limitations of the discriminatory UEA provisions and
the improperly tailored provisions of the Commission and Judges
Bills, and not of the minority view itself. It must be remembered
that Congress did not simply enact an exemption provision con-
taining a single dollar figure and no other specification of property,
although such a provision would have been far easier to draft than
, See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
112 See Commission Bill, supra note 70, § 4-503(b)(2) (allowing the homestead overflow
to be applied to the aggregate value of "[I]ivestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household fur-
nishings, tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles" and a "burial plot"); Judges
Bill, supra note 71, § 4-503(d) (allowing the homestead overflow to the applied to the aggre-
gate value of "[l]ivestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of trade or
profession, and motor vehicles"); UEA, supra note 72, § 5(1) (burial plot exempt without
limit), § 8(a)(1)-(2) (furnishings, appliances, wearing apparel, animals, and so forth, exempt
to $500 per item).
11 Compare supra note 12 and accompanying text with supra note 78.
[49:564
Section 522(d) (5)
the detailed exemption scheme adopted. 1 4 Furthermore, the ex-
plicit mention by Congress that the Code exemption provisions
were based "in large part" on the UEA" 5 demonstrates the legisla-
tive intent to continue with the tradition of specified property ex-
emptions embodied in that proposal. Finally, the fact that the
Commission and Judges Bills essentially adopted the minority ap-
proach indicates that this was the prevailing view during the four-
year period when the Code was developed. It seems unlikely that
Congress would reject this longstanding approach without a word.
3. The "Fresh Start." The significance of the debtor's "fresh
start" to the formulation of the Code can hardly be overstated. It
can, however, be misunderstood. The majority-view courts contend
that the frequently repeated congressional concern with providing
a meaningful fresh start for debtors 16 directly supports their lib-
eral reading of section 522(d). This view has attracted some aca-
demic commentary in its favor.' Any connection between the
debtor's fresh start and property exemptions, however, is a far
from established concept" 9 that is equally supportive of the minor-
, Some of the commentators who have urged a single dollar figure, however, have rec-
ognized that it would be no easy matter to pick the precise figure. See, e.g., Countryman,
supra note 19, at 746-48; Kennedy, Limitations, supra note 14, at 451-52; Comment, supra
note 19, at 1507-10.
115 Housz REPORT, supra note 68, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6317.
I"4 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 70, at 78-80; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
68, at 116-18, 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6076-79, 6087-
88; 124 CONG. REc. 28,258, 28,260, 32,392, 32,418 (1978); id. S17,432 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Butler); 123 CONG. REc. 35,436, 35,444-46, 35,451-53, 35,672 (1977).
117 In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) ("In view of Congress' goal of'provid-
ing a meaningful fresh start for debtors, it makes no sense to limit the type of property that
may be applied to the general exemption without a clear statement of Congressional intent
to do so."); In re LaFlamme, 14 Bankr. 21, 24 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1981) ("Congress did, in fact,
intend such a general exemption in order to better insure [sic] the debtor's fresh start
... ."); Leech v. Nichols, 4 Bankr. 711, 717 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980) (the minority ap-
proach "unnecessarily limits the intent of Congress to preserve the property available to a
debtor with which a fresh start can be made").
11 See, e.g., Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 843, 850-59 (1980).
"' See Kennedy, Reflections, supra note 14, at 447-50. Professor Kennedy notes that
the Supreme Court bankruptcy exemption cases of Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970),
and Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), "illustrate the extent to which the 'fresh
start' policy has become a dominant factor not only in construing the discharge provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act but even in determining the scope of the property of the estate of an
individual debtor that is to be administered in bankruptcy." Id. at 450.
However, Kokoszka-the Court's most recent pronouncement on debtor exemp-
tions-held an income tax refund to be property "sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy
past" to be nonexempt and not related to the "future wages" required for a fresh start. 417
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ity view.
Traditionally, the fresh start related solely to the debtor's dis-
charge from existing debt.120 Although the Code's legislative his-
tory contains statements in which the fresh start and exemptions
are discussed together, those references generally concern the pres-
ervation of a meaningful discharge by invalidating various creditor
encumbrances on exempted property. 121 The focus is thus not on
the exempted property itself, but rather on the completeness of
the discharge. The "fresh start," though important to the Code, is
largely unrelated to interpretation of paragraph (5).
Still, it is apparent that the likelihood of an effective fresh
U.S. at 647-48. Thus it would appear that the connection between exemptions and the
"fresh start" perceived by Professor Kennedy in 1974 hardly requires a liberal construction
of those exemptions.
120 For indications of congressional recognition of the primary importance of the dis-
charge to a fresh start, see CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 70, at 80; HousE RzPORT, supra
note 68, at 128-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws. 5963, 6089-95; 124
CONG. REc. 32,392 (1978). For commentary maintaining that the primary importance of the
discharge was maintained throughout the Code, see Cohen & Klee, supra note 109, at 681-
83, 721; Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.L. Rzv.
723, 723-24 (1980); Shonor, A New Deal for Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY
L.J. 588, 644-46 (1979). Concerning the primary importance of the discharge in general, see
Joslin, The Philosophy of Bankruptcy-A Re-Examination, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 189, 194-95
(1964); Kennedy, Reflections, supra note 14, at 434-36; Shuchman, supra note 45, at 420.
For an honorable mention given to exemptions as second only to the discharge in impor-
tance to debtors, see Countryman, supra note 19, at 678.
In the better known paeans to the fresh start, the courts have shown predominant con-
cern with discharge. Justice Sutherland is frequently cited:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from
the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.". . . This
purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of
public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy,
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Courts administering the Code have offered similar sentiments. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Rea-
gan, 13 Bankr. 588, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). But see Head v. Home Credit Co., 4
Bankr. 521, 524 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1980) ("The purpose of allowing exemptions is to provide
the debtor with sufficient property to support himself and his dependents and to make a
fresh start.").
"I See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 70, at 78-80; HousE REPORT, supra note
92, at 116-18, 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6077-78, 6087-
88; 124 CONG. REC. 32,392, 32,418 (1978); id. S17,432 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 123 CONG. REc.
35,451-53, 35,672 (1977).
The sole use of the words "fresh start" in the Code appears in an oddly inconsequential
section in which Congress indicated that it wished to ensure the debtor a fresh start in cases
ancillary to foreign proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
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start is affected at least in part by the debtor's retention of prop-
erty, particularly as regards items of high replacement cost that
are necessary for continued productive existence. Confiscation of
such property inevitably would require repurchase, and therefore
resumption of indebtedness. The majority and minority interpreta-
tions of paragraph (5) provide equal fresh starts by quantitative
measure.122 The minority approach, however, is more supportive of
the fresh start in qualitative terms. By adhering strictly to the
traditional forms of preferred property, it assures that those items
exempted will be directly relevant to continued productive
existence. 12
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Judicial and academic discussions of paragraph (5) have been
surprisingly free of any open assessment of the practical conse-
quences of the majority and minority views, perhaps because the
Code was so recently enacted that data concerning its impact on
bankruptcy administration is still limited. 2 4 In the two and one-
half years that the Code has been in operation, however, the accel-
eration of certain broad statistical trends that began much earlier
may be discerned. Under former law, the number of personal
bankruptcies increased from a post-World War II low of 10,196 in
1946 to a pre-Code high of 254,484 in 1975.25 Most of this increase
" See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
124 It is equally possible that the courts are simply avoiding any appearance of "judicial
legislation" in this unsettled area of new law. In In re Ancira, 5 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1980), a majority-view court allowed the "stacking" of state and federal exemptions by
joint debtors, thus permitting a homestead exemption of $37,500. Id. at 673, 675. The court
noted that-
Apparently the trustee believes that the stacking of the two exemptions is unjust
and a windfall to debtors. What is "unjust" or a "windfall" is a value judgment, how-
ever. Although to some, certain benefits may be unwarranted largess, to others, the
same relief may be an essential element of a "fresh start." Obviously, Congress in-
tended to grant extensive benefits to debtors through the new Code. In the absence of a
clear indication from the Congress as to the limits on these benefits, I do not believe
the courts can restrict exemptions, as requested by the trustee, on the basis of their
own concepts of fairness and propriety.
Id. at 675.
Judge Hughes, however, has stated flatly that the majority interpretation of paragraph
(5) entails the possible substitution of "less favored property" for "highly favored," the elec-
tion of federal rather than state exemptions "in the majority of cases," and the substantial
curtailment of cases in which assets are available to creditors. Hughes, supra note 2, at
1031-32.
"' Countryman, supra note 14, at 231.
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has been attributed to the expansion of consumer credit,12 6 a factor
unchanged since enactment of the Code. Nevertheless, the number
of bankruptcies filed in 1979 (the last pre-Code year) approxi-
mated the decade-long average of some 200,000, while in both 1980
and 1981 over 400,000 personal bankruptcies were filed: a 100%
increase apparently attributable in large part to the Code.127
Concerning the assets of those individuals declaring bank-
ruptcy, one relatively limited study made in 1959 determined that
the average debtor retained exempt assets worth $953, with only a
small percentage of estates providing any assets for distribution to
creditors. 128 A more extensive study completed in 1971 found that
the average exemptions claimed totalled $500, with only 16 percent
of debtor estates providing assets for creditors.12 1 A study con-
ducted since the Code's enactment found average exemptions to be
$7036, with only 5.3% of debtors being able to fully repay debts
from nonexempt assets. 30
These figures indicate that steadily increasing numbers of
debtors are filing for personal bankruptcy and, since the Code's
enactment, are doing so under exemption provisions that exceed
their average assets.131 Under either the majority or minority inter-
126 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 70, at 49-51; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note
19, at 3; Note, supra note 19, at 663.
127 BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 28, at 84; Evans, supra note 4, at 1259. Although
enacted in 1978, the Code did not go into effect until October 1, 1979, and thus the first
meaningful annual statistics measuring its impact are those for 1980. See supra note 1.
128 Comment, supra note 19, at 1504-07.
19 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 19, at 58, 81-84, 87-88. This study notes that
the actual as opposed to the claimed value of exemptions is difficult to determine given the
varying state exemption "start points" and property categories, particularly those that in-
clude those forms of property exempted without limit or exempted under a per item limit.
This problem of the data is also noted in House Hearings, supra note 71, at 768-69.
130 BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 28, at 69, 78. The study also determined that a sec-
ond sample of debtors, for which no debt repayment percentage was calculated, averaged
exemptions totalling $7885. Id. exhibit 3A-1, at 78. The study concluded that 15 to 30% of
consumer debtors could repay all debts out of future income. Id. at 72. A second volume of
the study, specifically addressing debtor characteristics and exemptions, was not prepared in
time for inclusion in this comment. See CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, MONOGRAPH No. 24,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (vol. 2) (1982).
131 It has long been recognized that most consumer bankruptcies are "no asset" pro-
ceedings in which creditors receive nothing. See, e.g., Douglas, Wage Earner Bankrupt-
cies-State v. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591, 626 (1933); Kennedy, Foreword to A Trib-
ute to Stefan A. Riesenfeld: A Discussion of the Proposed Bankruptcy Acts, 63 CALI. L.
REv. 1427, 1432 & n.23 (1975); Comment, supra note 19, at 1504. In a study conducted by
then-Professor William 0. Douglas in 1931 and 1932, 408 bankrupts were found to have
assets totalling $590,542 and debts totalling $6,616,365. Douglas, supra, at 593 n.8, 626.
More recent studies show a similar disparity. See, e.g., BANKRUPTCY STUDY, supra note 28,
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pretation of paragraph (5), the Code's exemption scheme thus al-
lows virtually complete retention of assets by the average debtor.132
Although this general result of debtor discharge without a corre-
sponding liquidation of assets appears to be unfair to creditors,1
it has been noted that the costs of such a policy are borne indi-
rectly by society at large.134 It is therefore entirely appropriate for
Congress to determine the particular level of personal wealth at
which the benefit of discharge will be extended to a debtor.135
These practical considerations place the controversy over par-
agraph (5) into its proper and limited perspective, but do not
divest it of importance. If Congress has determined a given level of
wealth below which debtors will have virtually complete property
exemption in bankruptcy, the proper resolution of the grubstake
and specified exemptions dispute is necessary to determine pre-
cisely what property is included below that level. Although most
debtors will be unaffected by the resolution of the paragraph (5)
controversy, it appears highly unlikely that Congress intended
those few debtors possessing valuable assets not specifically ex-
empted by the generous provisions of the Code to retain them at
the expense of creditors and, ultimately, of all society.136 The un-
exhibit 3A-1, at 78; D. STALEY & M. GmTH, supra note 19, at 57-58. In the artificial sense
that cancellation of indebtedness is income, some debtors arguably are achieving the chi-
merical "instant affluence" that concerned the Senate when it unsuccessfully proposed to
eliminate federal exemptions from the Code. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 92, at 6, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5792. That proposal has been reintro-
duced before the current Congress. See supra note 4.
12 Because all three of the studies cited supra notes 128-30 found an average debtor
asset figure below $8000, and because the Code's aggregate exemptions total $13,950 without
including either the per item value exemptions or the potential $7900 aggregate of para-
graph (5), see supra note 99, it is clear that the latter exemption will, on the average, be of
no concern to the debtor.
1" Congressmen frequently mentioned that the Code was intended to provide a bal-
anced treatment to debtors and creditors. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 68, at 4-5,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 5965-66; SENATE REPORT, supra note
92, at 5-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5791-92; 124 CONG. REC.
35,452 (1977); id. at 32,418 (1978); id. S17,432 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). Some commentators
have suggested, however, that the Code is particularly detrimental to creditors. See, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 2, at 16.
134 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
135 For a discussion of the policy implications of this determination, see generally
Vukowich, supra note 23, at 781-88.
134 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
Chapter 13 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. IV 1980) provides for debt ad-
justment rather than liquidation and thus allows complete retention of property by debtors
opting for that form of bankruptcy. This theoretically distinctive characteristic of debt ad-
justment proceedings is undercut by the practical effect of exemptions extended to debtors
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usual debtors noted earlier,13 7 owning large amounts of cash, busi-
ness inventory, and investment real estate, can hardly have been
anticipated as personal bankrupts by Congress, much less as bank-
rupts entitled to exempt such assets. Nevertheless, the exemption
of such assets is the inevitable consequence of the majority grub-
stake interpretation of paragraph (5).
CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to resolve the ambiguity of sec-
tion 522(d)(5) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code by examining the his-
torical background, underlying principles, language, legislative his-
tory, and practical ramifications of the provision. The better
reading of paragraph (5) allows the exemption of only those forms
of property specified within section 522(d). Though superficially
countertextual and consistently rejected by the courts, this inter-
pretation is in complete accord with the apparent congressional
intent.
The most satisfactory resolution of this issue would be for
Congress to amend section 522. Given current dissatisfaction with
the Code, such a resolution is increasingly likely.138 Failing that
outcome, however, the courts are still bound to resolve disputes
brought before them by using whatever principled basis promises
the soundest result. It is hoped that those courts addressing future
disputes over paragraph (5) will do so with an eye to the result
reached here.
Stephen F. Yunker
declaring a liquidation bankruptcy under chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. IV 1980).
Because chapter 7 debtors are in most cases able to achieve complete property retention, the
incentive to undertake debt repayment under chapter 13 is greatly reduced. This "intru-
sion" into chapter 13 caused by the Code's exemption scheme, however, may be equally
great under either interpretation of paragraph (5) discussed here, given their equivalence in
terms of total property value exempted.
See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 4.
